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Trust

What we protect, and how you can check it.

A church that puts its people on The Cross is trusting us with what they write when nobody else is reading. This page sets out what we do to protect it, and points to the exact place each statement can be checked. A statement we could not check is left off this page.

Our staff can read what members write. Nothing on this page softens that, and the full account of who reads what is on Your data.

What we protect

Your account and the community you belong to. Your progress across the four accounts. And the part that matters most: what you write, from journal entries and prayers to what you say to the coach.

All of it lives in one database, and the rules about who may read which row are kept in that database, not only in the screens of the app. A screen can have a bug. A rule in the database still holds.

The facts, and where to check them

Each line below names the file and line, or the database object, that makes it true. It also gives the day we last checked it against the real code or the live database.

Security and data handling facts, each with its source and the date it was checked.
What is trueWhere to check itChecked on
Every page of this site is served over HTTPS. Browsers are told to refuse a plain HTTP connection to this domain and its subdomains for two years.

How we checked: Read the Strict-Transport-Security header and the rule that applies it to every path. tests/security-headers.spec.ts checks the header on real responses.

  • next.config.ts, line 135 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 116 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 183 (website)
This site reaches the database and its sign in service only at their HTTPS address.

How we checked: Read the address the site is built with and the two places the browser calls it. The content security policy allows only that https origin for database calls.

  • next.config.ts, line 63 (website)
  • lib/supabase-browser.ts, line 352 (website)
  • lib/supabase-browser.ts, line 453 (website)
Every response from this site carries a content security policy. It refuses to be shown inside another site's frame, and it stops browsers guessing file types. It limits the address it passes on when you follow a link, and it switches off camera, microphone and location access.

How we checked: Read the header list in the site config. tests/security-headers.spec.ts checks each header on a page, a form page and an API route.

  • next.config.ts, line 133 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 114 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 146 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 136 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 137 (website)
  • next.config.ts, line 139 (website)
Row level security is switched on for every table in the database's public schema, so the database itself decides which rows each signed in person may read or change. On the day we checked, that was 178 tables out of 178.

How we checked: Counted with a read only catalog query against the live project, and confirmed by the Supabase security advisor.

  • Database: pg_class.relrowsecurity for every table in schema public (178 on, 0 off)
  • Database: Supabase security advisor: no table reported with row level security off
One community cannot reach another community's rows. A restrictive policy on 63 tables limits every read and write to the caller's own community. No other rule can widen a restrictive policy.

How we checked: Counted the restrictive policies that name the caller's community with a read only query, and read the function that resolves the caller's community.

  • Database: pg_policies: RESTRICTIVE policies naming app.current_tenant() on 63 public tables
  • supabase/migrations/0011_tenancy.sql, line 261 (app)
The log of our staff opening what members wrote cannot be edited or deleted by anyone, including us: the database refuses both. Every entry must carry a reason.

How we checked: Read the table and its two triggers in the migration, and confirmed both triggers exist on the live table.

  • supabase/migrations/0011_tenancy.sql, line 179 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0011_tenancy.sql, line 679 (app)
  • Database: triggers audit_no_update and audit_no_delete on public.admin_audit_log
A community's leaders cannot read their members' journal entries. In the database, a journal entry can be read only by the person who wrote it. The old setting that let a community open journals to its leaders is fixed to off, and it cannot be turned back on.

How we checked: Read every policy on the live journal table, the live body of the function the old setting used, and the check constraint that pins the setting off.

  • Database: public.journal_entries select policy: user_id = auth.uid()
  • Database: app.operator_may_read_content(uuid) returns false
  • Database: CHECK constraint tenants_operator_content_access_removed: operator_content_access = false
  • supabase/migrations/0115_remove_leader_content_switch.sql, line 126 (app)
You can take a copy of everything we hold about you from inside the app. One database function builds it, and it runs only for the person signed in. It includes every time a member of staff opened something of yours, and the reason they gave.

How we checked: Read the export function, the extension that adds newer tables to it, and the app code that calls it. Confirmed the function exists on the live project.

  • supabase/migrations/0110_music_hearts_and_waveforms.sql, line 847 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0110_music_hearts_and_waveforms.sql, line 865 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0114_music_plays_and_rollups.sql, line 2279 (app)
  • mobile/src/features/account/account.ts, line 132 (app)
Deleting your account in the app removes what you wrote and makes your profile anonymous at once, in one database step. The sign in credential itself is removed afterwards by a person on our team, and that is recorded too.

How we checked: Read the deletion function, the purge it calls, the console note on the credential step, and the app code that calls it. Confirmed the functions exist on the live project.

  • supabase/migrations/0022_account_deletion.sql, line 547 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0110_music_hearts_and_waveforms.sql, line 777 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0114_music_plays_and_rollups.sql, line 2014 (app)
  • supabase/migrations/0022_account_deletion.sql, line 583 (app)
  • admin/src/lib/live/deletion.ts, line 15 (app)
  • mobile/src/features/account/account.ts, line 90 (app)
The database runs on Supabase's Pro plan. On that plan, Supabase backs up the database automatically at least once a day and keeps at least the last seven days.

How we checked: Read the organization's plan from the Supabase API and the backup schedule Supabase publishes for that plan.

  • Database: Supabase organization plan: pro (read through the Supabase management API)
  • Supabase: Database Backups
The product analytics on this site write nothing to cookies or to your browser's storage, and form fields are masked.

How we checked: Read the settings PostHog is started with on this site.

  • components/analytics/analytics-loader.tsx, line 26 (website)
  • components/analytics/analytics-loader.tsx, line 29 (website)

"Website" is the code of this site. "App" is the code of the app, the leaders' console and the database migrations.

Outside services that handle data

We do not run every part of this ourselves. These are the outside services our code actually sends data to, what each is for, and what it receives. A service we have only talked about using is not listed.

Outside services, what each is for, and what data it receives.
ServiceWhat forWhat it receives
Supabaselib/supabase-browser.ts, line 352 (website); mobile/src/features/account/account.ts, line 90 (app)The database, sign in and file storage for the app, the console and this site.Everything the app stores: your account, your progress and what you write.
Vercelcomponents/analytics/analytics-loader.tsx, line 41 (website); mobile/serverless/api/transcribe.js, line 10 (app); admin/vercel.json, line 2 (app)Hosting for this site, the console and the app's server functions, plus page speed and visit counts on this site.Every request that reaches those servers, including your IP address and the page asked for.
PostHogcomponents/analytics/analytics-loader.tsx, line 25 (website)Product analytics on this site.Pages viewed and the named actions on this site, with form fields masked. No cookies.
Anthropicmobile/serverless/api/chat.js, line 34 (app); mobile/serverless/api/_safety.js, line 145 (app); admin/src/lib/live/church-study-ai.ts, line 416 (app)The AI model behind the coach, the help prompt check and study writing.What you say to the coach, and the context the app sends with it.
ElevenLabsmobile/serverless/api/tts.js, line 403 (app); mobile/serverless/api/voice-session.js, line 54 (app)Reading text aloud, and spoken conversations with the coach.The text the app reads aloud, and your voice during a spoken conversation.
Groqmobile/serverless/api/transcribe.js, line 91 (app)Turning a recorded voice note into text.The voice clip you record.
Expoadmin/src/lib/live/community-push.ts, line 44 (app)Delivering push notifications to phones.Your device's push token and the text of the notification.
Stripeadmin/src/lib/billing/stripe.ts, line 42 (app)Billing for communities.Only once billing keys are set.The community's name, its billing email address and its plan.
Resendadmin/src/lib/giving/mail/resend.ts, line 21 (app)Sending giving receipts and statements by email.Only once its key is set.The giver's email address and the receipt or statement sent to it.
Cloudflare Turnstileadmin/src/app/api/giving/_lib/turnstile.ts, line 29 (app)Telling a person from a bot on the giving form.A check token from the giver's browser.
GoHighLevelapp/api/demo/route.ts, line 29 (website); app/api/demo/route.ts, line 56 (website)Receiving church demo requests made on this site.Only once the demo form is switched on.What you type into the demo request form: name, church, role, city, attendance band, email and phone if given.

Taking your data, and deleting it

A copy of everything. In the app, under Your data, you can ask for a copy. The app calls one database function, export_my_data, which answers only for the person signed in. It returns everything we hold about you or that you wrote, including a list of every time a member of staff opened something of yours and the reason they gave. If you share a Cord with someone, your side is included and theirs is not, because it is theirs.

Deleting your account. Deleting calls request_account_deletion. In one step it removes what you wrote, makes your profile anonymous, and records that it happened. Two receipts stay, without your name on them: the log of staff access, and the record that you were shown how your data is handled before you wrote anything. Your sign in credential is held separately and the database cannot remove it for you, so a person on our team removes it afterwards and records the date.

The plain language version, with who can see what, is on Your data.

Reporting a security problem

If you find a weakness in the app, the leaders' console or this site, write to adamkay@omnipresence.media. Tell us what you found and how to see it again. A real person reads every message and will answer.

While you look, please do not read, change or keep anyone else's data, and give us a fair chance to fix the problem before you tell others. The same address is published for tools at /.well-known/security.txt.